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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of Habeas Corpus for
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae,
and Karen Taylor,
Minors
By LaPriel Taylor,
Petitioner and Appellant
vs.

George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents
and
In the Matter of the Adoption of Howard
Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor,
Minors
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents
vs.

LaPriel Taylor,
Contestant and Appellant.
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of Habeas Corpus for
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae,
and Karen Taylor,
Minors
By LaPriel Taylor,
Petitioner and Appellant
vs.

George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents
and
In the Matter of the Adoption of Howard
Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor,
Minors
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents
vs.

LaPriel Taylor,
Contestant and Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants and respondents herein, are husband
and wife, and they reside at 64 South 5th 'Vest Street,
Logan, Utah. They were married on June 14, 1939. He
is 54 years of age ( R. 117) and she is 37 years of age and
both are in good health. They reside about B~ blocks from
the 2nd Ward Church in Logan, and about 3}~ blocks from
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a grade school. (R. 116). There is also located in Logan
a junior high and senior high school, as well as the college. Respondents have no children of their own. ( R. 101).
They became acquainted with the plaintiff, LaPriel
Taylor, on June 1, 1949, when she came to their home to
inquire if respondents would take three of her children,
Wayne, Linda and Karen. Sheryl, plaintiff's fourth child
and next to the youngest was then living in Elsinore, Utah,
with plaintiff's relative. ( R. 27). At this time, Linda
and Karen were in poor health. ( R. 102, 103).
On June 2, 1949, respondents took Howard, Linda
and Karren into their home, and plaintiff applied to the
Welfare department at Logan, for their support. The
plaintiff then departed for California to live with her husband, ( R. 27) a_nd the respondents kept these children
under this arrangement until about January 15, 1950.
The plaintiff and husband, Howard Taylor, returned from
California about October 1, 1949, and brought Sheryl
Rae from Elsinore with them. They lived with plaintiff's
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Page, at Nibley, about four miles
south of Logan, for a portion of the time and a part of
the time at Ogden. (R. 34). On January 15, 1950, plaintiff was forced to take the children off the relief rolls in
Cache County, in order to relieve her husband from a
conviction in the Juvenile Court, of Cache County, because of his failure to support them. ( R. 33). Plaintiff
then took the children to Ogden, ( R. 104) and was on
relief in Weber County from January 15, to March 9,
1950. (R. 37).
About February 15, 1950, defendants, while returning from Salt Lake City, stopped at plaintiff's apartment
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in Ogden to visit the children. ( R. 151 ) . The children
were pleased to see the defendants, particulary Karen,
the youngest. (R. 104, 105). The latter part of February,
1950, defendants had occasion to visit the plaintiff's parents, at Nibley, and Karen and Sheryl were there. They
permitted defendants to take Karen to their home and
she remained for a couple of days, and on March 1, 1950,
it being her birthday, defendants took her to Ogden,
( R. 105). When they arrived at plaintiff's apartment she
asked defendants if they - "Wanted some children, she
had some to give away," ( R. 106, 152). Plaintiff informed
defendants that - "She had written to the Welfare in
Salt Lake and she hadn't received any answer as to the
placement of the children." ( R. 106). Defendants then
informed plaintiff that if she intended to give the children
away, the defendants wanted them, (R.106, 152). Thereupon plaintiff consented to give the children to the defendants and told them to have a written adoption agreement prepared and requested defendants to return to
Ogden on March 9, 1950, when her husband Howard
would be there to sign the agreement, ( R. 106, 152).
The defendants returned to Ogden on March 9th with
the adoption agreement, and plaintiff and her husband
were at the apartment. On this occasion the defendants
were accompanied by the plaintiff's parent, Mr. and Mrs.
Page, and the children Sheryl and Karen. ( R. 106, 152).
After their arrival defendants gave the adoption agreement to plaintiff and she examined it, and personally
retained possession thereof for an hour or more and until
the plaintiff and her husband were ready to leave for the
bus depot, and enroute thereto, they stopped at the notary
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public's office. There plaintiff and her husband entered
the office, and defendants remained in the car, (R. 107,
154). Mter plaintiff and her husband had executed the
adoption agreement they came out of the office and
entered the defendants car and gave the agreement to
:Mr. Waddoups, (R. 108, 153 ). He examined it and observed their signatures thereon, and that it had been
notarized, ( R. 108). Enroute from there to the bus
station plaintiff said that- "She was pleased because she
knew that the children would have a secured home, something to look forward to in their future lives, and that
she didn't think she was making a mistake in doing so,"
( R. 108, 153). The defendants returned to the apartment,
where lvlr. and Mrs. Page and the children were waiting,
and the children were taken to defendants' home in Logan,
where they have since resided with the defendants,
(R. 109, 111). Defendant Waddoups identified the
adoption agreement which he received from the plaintiff
as defendant's Exhibit One. (R. 108, 109).
On March 9, 1950, the plaintiff appeared to have
normal health, about the same as she appeared to have
at the time of the trial. ( R. 111). During the summer
and fall of 1950, the plaintiff made three or four visits
to the defendant's home, and on each occasion expressed
satisfaction with the condition of the children, ( R. 112),
and during the summer and fall of 1950, the plaintiff
wrote five letters to the defendants, and in all of them
she expressed satisfaction with the manner in which defendants were taking care of the children, and also the
home conditions and environment ( R. 51). The last
letter was written on November 9, 1950, (R. 53), in which
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she offered to execute a relinquishment for adoption of
her expected child, which was born on November 29th,
1950.
The defendants own real property in Logan and
Preston, Idaho, valued at $12,000.00, debt free. The
defendants also have a bank account, which at the time
of trial, was about $1200.00; an automobile and household
furniture. The defendants have enjoyed and do now
enjoy good health, and defendant Waddoups has steady
employment. (R. 112, 113)·.
The defendants have bestowed love and affection
upon and, have taken the best of care of the children,
(R. 1l2, 113, 144, 180-189), and have made corrections
in their health conditions, and at the time of the trial,
the children were healthy and in good physical and
mental condition. The children are also living in a good
wholesome environment, and will receive educational,
religious, and moral training. (R. 116, 171-174). And
the children love the defendants and show it by their
reactions~ and they frequently tell the defendants that
they love them. (R. 155, 169, 180, 181-189).
ARGUMENT
PoiNT I. The findings, conclusions, and fudgment of
the court, denying the plaintiff's writ of Habeas Corpus,
(File, pages 30-37) and the findings, conclusions of law,
and fudgment, granting the plaintiff's petition for adoption, (File, pages 38-47) and the order of adoption, (File,
page 48) are amply supported by defendant's Exhibit One,
an irrevocable contract for adoption, as well as by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at the trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

The said consent to adoption, "Exhibit One," executed
by plaintiff~ LaPriel Taylor and Howard Taylor, natural
parents of the children named therein, is in the usual form
used in adoption proceedings and for the convenience
of this court, said instrument is herewith set forth in its
entirety:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Adoption of
Howard Wayne Taylor,
Lindsay Kay Taylor,
Sheryl Rae Taylor, and
Karen Taylor,
Minors.

CONSENT TO
ADOPTION

We, the undersigned, parents of the following named
children, to-wit:
Howard Wayne Taylor ______________ Age 9 years
Linda Kay Taylor ------------------------ Age 7 years
Sheryl Rae Taylor ------------------------ Age 2 years
Karen Taylor ------------------------------ Age 1 year
hereby consent that the above named children may be
adopted by George Q. Waddoups and wife, Maria A.
Waddoups, of Logan, Utah, as prayed for in the petition
for adoption to be filed in the above entitled court and
cause and in pursuance to the statutes in such cases made
and provided.
DATED this 9th day of March, A. D., 1950.
HOWARD C. TAYLOR
LAPRIEL PAGE TAYLOR.
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Weber

1
rss.
J

On this 9th day of March, A. D., 1950, personally
appeared before me, Howard Taylor and LaPriel H.
Taylor, the signers of the above and foregoing consent
to adoption, who duly acknowledged to me that they
understood the same and that the same was executed
voluntarily and of their own free will and consent.
RHEAH B. POULTER,
Notary Public.
Residing at: Ogden, Utah.
My Commission Expires: January 17, 1954.
The defendants relied upon said adoption agreement,
and on March .9, 1950, they took the children into their
home with the express intention of adopting them. (Tr.
108, 191). The plaintiff was conversant with the intent
of Exhibit One, because it is denominated as a "Consent
to Adoption." It also mentioned the name of the court
and cause, ·so plaintiff was put on notice that adoption
proceedings were contemplated. "Exhibit One," also provides that the undersigned - "hereby consent that the
above named children may be adopted by George Q.
Waddoups and wife, Maria A. Waddoups of Logan, Utah,
as prayed for in the petition for adoption to be filed in
the above entitled court and cause." And in the acknowlegement it expressly provides that the plaintiff and
her husband acknowledged to the notary public "that
they understood- "the consent for adoption- "and that
the same was executed voluntarily and of their own free
will and consent."
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It will thus be seen from the form and contents of

"Exhibit One" that plaintiff was put on notice of the true
intent, purpose, and finality of said contract for adoption.
It will also be seen that there is no condition or qualification expressed therein. She was definitely advised that
adoption proceedings would follow in accordance with "the statutes in such cases made and provided."
This court has had occasion to determine the legal
effect to be given to a written relinquishment and consent
for adoption and in each case this court has held that
parents may by contract legally transfer and surrender
their child or children into the custody of another person
to be adopted by the latter, if the child is not prejudiced
by the transaction. The cases so holding are:
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423
Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah 373, 134 Pac. 898
Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 Pac. 328
Flora v. Flora, 84 Utah 143, 29 P 2d 498
In the Stanford case this court had under consideration a written consent for adoption, executed by the
childs mother, the child having been forn out of wedlock.
Subsequently thereto, the childs mother having married,
brought action against Mr. and Mrs. Gray, with whom
the said child had been placed for adoption.
At the trial, the consent for adoption was offered and
received in evidence, but the trial court held that the
child's mother was not bound by said contract. On appeal
to this court, the trial court was reversed. Construing
the legal effect of a written contract for adoption, this
court said:
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"There are some authorities which hold that a contrat
made by a parent in which he surrenders the care,
control, and custody of his minor child to another is
void as against public policy. The great weight of
authority, however, sustains the position of appellants
that a parent may by contract legally transfer and
surender his infant child into the custody of another
where the interest of the child is not prejudiced by
the transaction."
In Humel v. Parrish et. al. 43 Utah 373, 134 Pac. 898;
the child was born to appellant out of wedlock, at Budapest, Hungary, on February 13, 1903. When the child
was about 14 months old appellant left the child with her
mother, and about two years thereafter appellant's mother
emigrated to the United States, bringing with her the
child. Shortly thereafter the grandmother believing that
her daughter was dead, signed a written relinquishment
and consent for adoption of the child to Samuel J. and
Caddie R. Parrish. Later the childs mother brought
habeas corpus against Mr. and Mrs. Parrish, to obtain the
custody of the child. The trial court denied plaintiffs
writ, and she appealed to this court.
In referring to the theory adopted by the trial court,
this court said: ·
"It seems that the court, in rendering its decision

denying the writ, proceeded upon the theiry; First,
that the appellant had surrendered and delivered
the child into the care and custody of its grandmother; and, second, that it would be for the best
interest of the child for it to remain in the care and
custody of the respondents."
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In the course of the opinion in Humel v. Parrish,
supra ,this court quoted what was thought to be the correct n1le laid down by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the
case of Smidt Y. Benenga, 118 N. W. 440, in the following
language:
"Generally speaking, the natural parents are entitled
to the care, custody, and control of their minor children; but they may by agreement or conduct deprive
thems~!ves of this natural right and confer it upon
others.
In Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 P. 328,
this court announced the rule which we think is applicable
to the facts in the instant case, and we quote from 55
Utah, page 5:
"It is true, everything else being equal, that the
natural parent of a child is entitled to its care, custody,
and control. This court, however, by its former decisions, is committed to the more humane doctrine
that in cases of this nature the natural parent may,
by agreement or by conduct, deprive himself of his
natural right and confer it upon others; that in cases
where the parent has lost that right either by agreement or conduct the guiding principle will always be
the best interests of the child for the present and its
future. Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228, 129 Pac. 423
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 989; Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah,
373, 134 Pac. 898.

In the case of Flora v. Flora, 29 P. 2d. 498, at page
499, this court said: "Here the parents by written consent surrendered the custody of the children to the respondents."
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The case of Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28, S.W.
281 is cited and quoted in Stanford v. Gray, Supra. The
following rule laid down by the Texas court is applicable
to the facts in the instant case: We quote:
"Where, however, a parent, by writing or otherwise,
has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor
child into the custody and under the control of another, as in the case at bar, and then seeks to recover
possession of the child by writ of habeas corpus, such
parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable discretion of the court to disrupt private domestic relations which he has voluntarily brought about, and
the court will not grant the relief, unless upon a hearing of all the facts it is of the opinoin that the best
interests of the child would be promoted thereby."
In the case of Curtis v. Curtis, 5 Gray (Mass.) 537,
also cited in the Stanford case, the court said:
"And the courts are all of the opinion that, so far as
the rights of the mother are concerned, she has relinquished them by this instrument which operates
either as a contract or an estoppel - and it is immaterial which - to prevent her from now setting
up her rights."
The case of Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, appears
to be the earliest case in this jurisdiction and the opinion
deals exhaustively with the fundamental principles involved. In the next case, Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah
373, the principles laid down in Stanford v. Gray, were
followed, and this court in the Hummel case said:
"This doctrine was recognized and approved in the
case of Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228, 129 Pac. 423,
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recently decided by this court. In addition to the
authorities there cited we invite attention to the following cases in which the principle was adhered to
and followed: In Re. Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38
N.W. 876; Jones v. Darnall, 103 Ind. 569, 2 N.E. 229,
53 Am. Rep. 545; United States v. Green, 3 Mason,
482, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256; Schneider v. Schwabe
(Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S.W. 265, Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S.E. 685, 40 L.R.A. 623; Kelsey
v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 27 Atl. 679, L.R.A. 471;
Sturtevant v. State, 15 Neb. 459, 19 N.W. 617, 48
Am. Rep. 349; Fields v. Deming, 56 Wash. 259, 105
Pac. 466."
In the third case of Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1,
the principles announced in the Stanford case and restated in the Hummel case, were reiterated again.
And in the latest case to be decided by this court,
involving a written consent for adoption is Flora v. Flora,
84 Utah 143, 29 P 2d. 498, and it was declared in the
opinion that - "Here the parents, by written consent, surrendered the custody of the children to the respondent
A. B. Flora." And the Stanford, Hummel and Christensen
cases herein reviewed were cited. And from the decisions in these cases it will be seen that the legal effect
of a written consent for adoption, which is followed by
a petition and order of adoption, casts the burden on the
natural parent - "To show that the children are not receiving proper physical, moral, and intellectual training."
The facts in the following Utah cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar.
Harrison v. Harker 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716.
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Jones v. Moore 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191.
Jensen v. Early 63 Utah 604, 228 P. 217.
Sherry v. Doyle 68 Utah 250, 249 P. 250.
Walton v. Coffman 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d. 97.
Baldwin v. Nielsen 110 Utah 172, 172, 170 P. 2d. 179.
Hardcastle v. Hardcastle 221 P. 2d. 883.
In none of the foregoing cases had the parent relinquished his or her rights to the child, by a written consent
for adoption. And in most, if not all of those cases, the
parent had parted with the custody of child, either because of illegitimacy, or leaving the child for board and
lodging, or leaving the child with its grandparents or other
relatives. And in some of these cases the parents had later
entered into marriage, resulting in an improved condition,
whereby the child could be returned to its natural parent,
or parents, thus resulting in re-union of parents and child.
And in one or more of the cases, the child was returned
to the natural mother because of absence of a written
consent; and where it was also shown that the parent had
not abandoned the child.
The appellant first assigns error, (Point 1) contending that the consent for adoption was not executed in
accordance with the provisions of Section 14-4-8. It seems
to be appellant's contention that· notwithstanding she and
her husband executed the consent for adoption to meet
the requirements of Section 14-4-4, it is also imperative
that an additional consent be executed under Section
14-4-8, at the time of the hearing for adoption, where
their written consent to adoption is again necessary and
must be signed in the presence of the court.
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This contention was rejected by the trial court, in
Yiew of the fact that the appellant had previously, to-wit,

on ~larch 9, 1950, executed a written consent for adoption.
And for the further reason that the adoption order of
January 8, 1951, was vacated and the plaintiff was given
a hearing on the merits, where she was permitted to offer
evidence in opposition to the petition for adoption.
Under appellants contention it would be necessary
for a natural parent, who has executed a written consent
for adoption, to meet the requirements of Section 14-4-4,
to again appear in court when the petition for adoption
is heard and sign another consent under Section 14-4-8.
This would seem to be a strained interpretation to
place upon Sections 14-4-4, and 14-4-8. Section 14-4-4,
provides that - "A legitimate child cannot be adopted
without the consent of its parents, if living." The converse of that provision is - that a legitimate child can be
adopted by another if the parent's consent to the adoption
is procured.
Thus, as in the case at bar, the parents having executed a written consent under oath, the provision of
Section 14-4-4, is legally complied with. If so, why should
it be necessary for the parents to appear in court at tht1
hearing to be held at least one year later, and sign a second
consent. Section 14-4-4, does not so provide. This would
be very impractical, as well as absurd, and in most cases
impossible of performance.
Section 14-4-4 provides four methods to affect the
adoption of children.
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1.

Consent of parents to adoption of legitimate child.

2.

Consent of mother to adoption of illegimate child.

3. Consent of parents not necessary where they have
been judicially deprived of the custody of children on
account of cruelty, neglect or desertion.
4. Where a parent or parents place the child with
a child placing agency, and give such agency a written
release of their control and custody of such child; and
such agency subsequently executes a consent in writing
to the adoptive parents in whose home such child has
been placed for adoption.
When Sections 14-4-4 and 14-4-8, are carefully examined it would appear that the latter section has no
application to adoption hearings petitioned under paragraphs one, two, and three of Section 14-4-4.
It is) however, the practice under sub-paragraph four,
of Section 14-4-4, for an agent of a child placing agency
to appear in court and give the agency's consent for adoption at the time of the adoption hearing, and this is no
doubt what is intended by the language used in Section
14-4-8, where it provides that, the other person whose
consent is necessary, must appear before the district court
of the county where the person adopting resides and the
necessary consent must thereupon be signed." When this
language is read in connection with the last provision
of Section 14-4-4, it will be seen tha~ they harmonize. Appellants counsel has failed to cite a Utah case supporting
their contention under point 1.
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In 1 Am. Jur. 641, the rule is stated that notice of
the petition is not necessary "where written consent thereto has been filed with the court." If notice of the hearing
is not necessary a Fortiori the natural parents presence
in court is not necessary.
The appellant next assigns error, (Point 2) that the
trial court erred in finding that the consent of adoption as
signed by the plaintiff was irrevocable. It was held in
Stanford v. Gray, supra, that, - "So far as the rights of
the mother is concerned, she has relinquished them by
this instnrment, which operates either as a conract or an
estoppel - and it is immaterial which - to prevent her
from setting up her rights."
And in Flora v. Flora, 29 P. 2d, 498, at page 499, this
court said: "Here the parents by written consent surrendered the custody of the children to the respondents."

It would also appear that the consent to adoption in
the instant case is irrevocable, under the rule adhered to
by this court in the Stanford, Hummel, Christensen and
Flora cases. The rule as stated in the Stanford case, on
pages 242 of 42 Utah, is:
"What we do hold is that, Mrs. Hansen having voluntarily relinquished and surrendered her right to
the care and custody of the child, the burden is on
her to show that the parties who acquired the custody
of the child by virtue and in pursuance of tJ:le relinquishment have in some way been derelict in their
duty to the child, and that it would be better for the
best interests of the child to take it out of their custody a?,d return it to her. This she has wholly failed
to do.
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Plaintiff contends that the children were taken with
the understanding that they would be returned if plaintiff's health improved. This was refuted by defendants
since they testified that they took the children in pursuance to the written consent for adoption and relied upon
it. And moreover the consent for adoption, "Exhibit One"
contains no provision to that effect. Nor is there any such
contention made in plaintiff's letters, (R. 51-53) and the
last one was written on November 8, 1950, eight months
after plaintiff relinquished her parental rights to the
children.
Appellant next assigns error (Point 3) that the court
erred in finding in the adoption proceedings that the
plaintiff had abandoned her children for the reason that
there were no allegations in the petition for adoption that
the children had been abandoned by the plaintiff, etc.
The petition for adoption in the instant care was of
course predicated upon the written consent for adoption,
and that was sufficient for adoption purposes under the
sta~ute. However, in the various petitions filed by the
appellant, (File, pages 7-8, 11-15) there are allegations
that she was justified in signing the consent for adoption
because of her ill health, and in the answer to the affidavit
of appellant by the respondents (File, pages 23-27) it is
alleged among other things that, "since the birth of Sheryl
Rae and Karen Taylor, the affiant had lived very little, if
any, with said children. That although plaintiff could
have made a home for the children during the aforesaid
period of time, she has preferred to seek employment and
live separate and apart from them, thus satisfying her own
selfish interests to the detriment of her children."
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It will appear that the issue of abandonment was
thus created by the pleadings and there is evidence in the
record that for a number of years the plaintiff has lived
away from the children, leaving them with her parents
and later with the defeJ?.dants, and that plaintiff has been
more concerned about her personal pleasure and welfare
than she has for the welfare of her children. This was
evidenced when plaintiff left the children with defendants
on June 2, 1949, and departed for the state of California,
on the pretext that she was going to be reconciled with
her husband, when as a matter of fact she actually went to
California to be with her husband and enjoy his company
without being burdened with the children. This is further
evidenced by the fact that she did not return until about
October 1, 1949, and although she returned with her husband to the home of her parents at Nibley, they did not
then provide for these children, but permitted them to
remain with the respondents. And for the next 2~~ months
she and her husband lived a portion of the time with her
parents and the other portion in Ogden, while the children
remained with the respondents.

And it is doubtful that the plaintiff would have taken
the children from the defendants custody on January 15,
1950, had it not been for the fact that the Department of
Public Welfare of Cache County had preferred a complaint against Howard Taylor, the father of these children
for neglect and non-support, and in order to relieve him
of a conviction in the Juvenile Court, plaintiff removed
these children to Ogden. But between January 15th and
March 9, 1950, or for a period of less than 2 months, the
two younger children, Sheryl and Karen, spent a consid-
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erable portion of that time at Nibley with their grandparents. And except for the fact that the two older children, Wayne and Linda, were in school at Ogden, they
would likely have also been living for a portion of this time
with their grandparents at Nibley.
It would thus seem that there was an issue created
on the question of abandment, and although the plaintiff
was bound and controlled by defendant's Exhibit One,
the consent agreement for adoption, the court also had
a right to make a finding on the question of abandonment,
in view of the plaintiff's neglect and absence from the
children for considerable periods of time as shown by
the pleadings and evidence.

Point 2. The plaintiff and appellant having by agreement (Exhibit One), relinquished her natural right to
to the children, she is not entitled to regain their custody
and control, unless she can establish that the children are
being neglected and mistreated by the defendants.
The foregoing rule was laid down in the case of
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah at page 242, and as it was
applied in that case against the mother of the child, where
the court stated the rule in the following language:
"What we do hold is that, Mrs. Hansen having voluntarily relinquished and surrendered her right to
the care and custody of the child, the burden is on
her to show that the parties who acquired the custody
of the child by virtue and in pursuance of the relinquishment have in some way been derelict in their
duty to the child, and that it would be better for the
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best interests of the child to take it out of their
custody and return it to her. This she has wholly
failed to do."
The foregoing ntle was re-affirmed and applied
against the parent in the later cases of Humel v. Parrish,
43 Utah 373, Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, and Flora
v. Flora, 84 Utah 143, that when the natural parent has
relinquished his right to the control and custody of the
children, in order to regain their custody and control
which he has lost, he must show that the child is being
neglected and mistreated by the adopting parents. The
trial court, found at the conclusion of the trial in the
instant case, that the appellant had relinquished her right
to the custody and control of all four children by virtue
of defandants Exhibit One, but owing to the fact that
Wayne was ten years of age and had elected to return to
the appellant, the court granted the writ of Habeas Corpus
as to him, but denied the writ as to Linda, Sheryl and
Karen. The court also granted the petition for adoption
in the case of Linda, Sheryl and Karen, and denied it without prejudice as to Wayne because of his election. Thus
the court held that the plaintiff relinquished her rights
to the custody and control of Linda, Sheryl, and Karen,
because of her execution and delivery of the written consent for their adoption. It was therefore necessary for
the plaintiff to establish, which she failed to do at the
trial, that Linda, Sheryl and Karen were being neglected
and mistreated by the defendants.
The appellant not only failed to prove that the children were being neglected but the evidence shows that the
interest, welfare and happiness of the children has been
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improved during the time that they have lived with the
defendants, from March 9, 1950, to the time of the trial
on May 14, 1951, or for a period of 14 months. The witnesses Henry R. Cooper, school principal at
Woodruff school which Linda and Wayne attended (R.
171-173), and Lela Nelson ( R. 168, 187, 188, 189), Ella
C. Spillman ( R. 181, 183), and Blanch Smith ( R. 183185), and Jess Bouwuis (R. 176, 181, 188, 189), all testified that they were acquainted with the defendants, had
frequently visited their home and, that they had observed
the conditions of the children, both in the home, in s'chool,
and in public. Their testimony is proof of the splendid
manner in which the defendants were taking care of these
children, making a good home for them and being good,
faithful, devoted and loving parents. The children are
living in a modern home, and have access to religious, and
educational advantages, and that the children's future
security, and moral welfare will be promoted by remaining with the defendants. The above witnesses testified
that they had observed mutual love and affection exhibited by the children towards the defendants and by the
defendants towards the children, and that Mrs. Waddoups
was invariably at home taking care of the children when
the witnesses called to visit them.
The children have lived with the defendants from
June 2, 1949 to the present time, or for a period of approximately 28 months, with an interruption of about 7 weeks,
from January 15 to March 9, 1950, and during which time
the children have enjoyed all the advantages that could
come to children by devoted and loving parents, and that
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may be contrasted with the treatment the children were
receiving when under the control of the plaintiff when
they were moved around from one place to another.
And consider further the fact that the children· would
return to a strange mother and step-father. The advantages pointed to by :Mr. Justice Latimer, in the majority
opinion of this court in Hardcastle v. Hardcastle, 221 P.
2d. 883, are all in favor of the children in the case at bar,
provided they are permitted to remain with defendants.
And moreover, as the trial court found, the appellant now
has two of her children and will likely give birth to others.
\Vhat is herein stated under defendants point 2, also
sufficently answers appellant's point 4 and 5. The cases
therein relied on viz, Jones v. Moore, 213 P. 191, Baldwin
v. Nielson 170 P. 2d. 179, and Hardcastle v. Hardcastle,
221 P. 2d. 883, are not in point. In none of those cases
did the parent execute a written consent for adoption. And
in all of those cases this court held that the natural parent
had not abandoned the child. However~ in the Hardcastle
case, the question involving where the best interests of
the child would be promoted was very close, and by a
three to two decision~ the mother was awarded the cutody
of the child. But as hereinbefore stated the advantages
claimed for the child in the majority opinion in the Hardcastle case, by being awarded to the 1nother, argue in
favor of the children remaining with respondents in the
instant case.
At the trial defendants counsel asked plaintiff "You would have the court understand that from March
9th, up to the 29th of November, ( 1950) you had always
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felt it was for the best interests of the children to be
adopted by the Waddoups?" ( R. 50). Plaintiff said "No"
and testified that she changed her mind in July 1950.
( R. 50). Evidently, plaintiff had forgotten the letters she
wrote to defendants before and subsequent to July 1950.
On May 10, 1950, two months after plaintiff executed
the written consent for adoption and relinquished her
parental rights to the custody and control of the children,
she wrote a letter to the defendants in which she stated ''I'm satisfied that the best thing for the babies has been
done and am grateful that people as yourselves will have
the blessings and reward of this life and eternal in watching the development of these little souls into useful
citizens." ( R. 51).
On October 2, 1950, about three months after plaintiff is supposed to have changed her mind, she wrote to
the defendants and greeted them as "Dearest George and
~,faria," and in the course of the letter she said: "I don't
want to shake their security. It means peace of mind and
contentment to me." Then she refers to her unborn child
which she expected in November 1950, and continued as
follows: "Being full brothers and sisters, they should be
together, having what you afford them, the hopes, advantages, environment that I could not give as natural
parent." ( R. 52).
On October 25th, plaintiff wrote a third letter to
defendants and greets them as, "Dearest Maria and
George." "I am fine and in better condition than I was
prior to last week. Time is close. Any day I had thought
about the paper (Consent for adoption of unborn baby)
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to be drawn up before the child is born. Howard will
haYe to send it when he comes to the hospital. I am to
telegraph him when it happens. His consent and signa~
ture to both adoption and operation permit is mandatory.
So I will call yon from the hospital and tell you the details
of when to come for the baby." ( R. 52, 53).
The foregoing letter was followed by another letter,
dated November 6, from plaintiff to defendants: "Dear
:\!aria and George; I have a mixture of feelings, but I'll
keep you informed, at any rate. Did you see about the
paper? (consent for adoption). Howard came and went
back but will return at the time, as it is mandatory that
he sign paper too." ( R. 53).
Two days later, on November 8, "Dear Maria and
George: "You write and tell me, I will have the baby
within eight days now, so we should be satisfied as what
was done before and would be now." Then the letter
goes on to arrange for delivery of the baby to the defendants at Beth's place. And she requested defendants
to, "Bring the paper and Howard and myself can sign.
I don't know how else it can be arranged." ( R. 53).
The foregoing letters are important as they portray
the true feelings of the plaintiff. They also definitely
prove that plaintiff was continuously from March 9,
1950, to November 8, 1950, or for a period of eight months,
highly pleased and contented because she had relinquished the children named in defendant's Exhibit One,
to defendants for adoption. She was high in her praise
of the care, nurture, advantages and environment the
children were receiving and enjoying in the defendants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

home - and plaintiff wanted her unborn baby to have
the same care, nuture, advantage, and environment by
being adopted by the defendants.
Yet after expressing herself as aforesaid, in about one
month thereafter, she decided to take legal action against
the very people whom she had so recently praised. And,
either forgetting the letters, or believing that the defendants had destroyed them, plaintiff wanted the court to
believe that she had changed her mind as early as July
1950. (R. 50).
Plaintiff offered in evidence "Exhibit A," copy of
divorce decree entered in the Third District Court, on
December 13, 1950, in which action she procured a divorce from her husband Howard Taylor. The court found
(File, page 44) that the award of the children Linda,
Sheryl and Karen to plaintiff in the divorce action, was
not binding upon these defendants, because they were
not parties to, nor aware of said action.
Attention is directed to the court's Exhibit A, the
report from the Department of Public Welfare. From said
report it will be seen that plaintiff has shown more interest
for her own welfare than for her children. This conclusion
is also supported by the record in this case. The Department of Public Welfare also expressed the opinion that
the best interests of the children will be subserved by
remaining with the defendants.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff had a fair trial on the merits in this case,
and the court had the opportunity to observe the appear-
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ance of the plaintiff and defendants, and also had an
opportunity to observe the appearance of the children
and their condition with respect to their welfare.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court indicated
that the plaintiff had relinquished her rights to the children by reason of having executed the written consent for
adoption, and viewed the case as being a proceeding of an
equitable nature, and that the controlling principle must
be the best interests of the children. This view fully
accords with the views expressed by this court on numerous occasions.
Considering the fact that the plaintiff had relinquished her right to the children and that the defendants
relied thereon, and in good faith took the children into
their custody, and have given these children the best possible care, and nuture, and will be able to afford them
with educational, intellectual and moral training. It is
respectfully submitted that the findings, conclusions and
judgment of the court and the order of adoption made
and entered by this court on June 18th and 19th, be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

L. E. NELSON
Attorney for defendants
and respondents.
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